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ALD-202        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3197 
___________ 
 
NATHANIEL L. ADDERLY, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CO STOFKO; LT. DOMAGAUER; CO WHITE; CO KONDRASKI; CO KOTZ; 
LT. WILDE; CO LYNCH; LARSON, Deputy Warden; WARDEN PIAZZA; 
LT. AMEEN; CAPT. ORSWICK; CO WICHT; CO BLEICH; RON, Supervising 
Therapist Ron “Doe”; KAWALSKI, Hearing Examiner 
________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-12-cv-01546) 
District Judge:  Honorable Edwin M. Kosik 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal for Jurisdictional Defect, Possible Dismissal Pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and 
I.O.P. 10.6 
March 31, 2016 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 5, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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___________ 
PER CURIAM 
 Nathaniel Adderly, an inmate at SCI Houtzdale proceeding pro se and in forma 
pauperis, appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his civil-rights complaint 
without prejudice for the failure to state a claim.  Because the appeal presents no 
substantial question, we will summarily affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 Adderly filed a complaint in the District Court alleging that the defendants 
violated his constitutional rights in numerous ways during his time in custody at Luzerne 
County Correctional Facility (“LCCF”).  The complaint contains 544 paragraphs, plus an 
additional 35 pages of exhibits.  The first main set of allegations concerns Adderly’s 
assignment to Protective Custody (“PC”) status, which included a distinctive yellow 
uniform.  Adderly alleged that he found the yellow uniform stigmatizing because other 
inmates generally knew that such uniforms were worn by inmates charged with crimes of 
a sexual nature.  Adderly also alleged that his PC status set restrictions and denied access 
to amenities to an extent that amounted to a constitutional violation.   
The second main set of allegations concerns a series of retaliation and conspiracy 
claims.  Adderly alleged that he unsuccessfully grieved his PC status, and that thereafter 
he endured numerous actions and incidents (which are set out in over 400 paragraphs in 
the complaint) that he contended were in retaliation for filing that grievance.  In 
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particular, Adderly alleged that he was unjustifiably placed in what he contended was 
punitive Restrictive Housing Unit (“RHU”) confinement, and that time and again over 
the next several months other disciplinary charges were brought against Adderly that he 
alleged were based on false or distorted facts.  Those included charges for being 
disruptive and disobeying an oral order, making an aggressive move at a hallway 
monitor, possessing an unknown substance, striking another inmate, hoarding materials, 
use of abusive or obscene language, threatening a prison guard, spitting on a prison 
guard, and other violations.  Adderly also alleged that the defendants conspired to rig the 
misconduct hearings and grievance proceedings related to all of these incidents.  Adderly 
alleged further that he suffered other adverse actions in retaliation for his grievance 
concerning his PC status, such as humiliating strip searches, the denial of access to 
hygiene products and clean uniforms, rough handling when cuffed and tethered (with 
prison guards jerking him around by the cuffs), and the destruction or confiscation of 
personal property (including legal materials). 
 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for the failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted, and for the failure to make a short and plain 
statement of each claim.  After briefing on the motion to dismiss, Adderly filed a motion 
to supplement the complaint to add additional allegations against some of the defendants.  
The District Court then dismissed Adderly’s complaint, but granted Adderly 20 days to 
file an amended complaint.  In its memorandum and separate order, the District Court set 
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forth the standards that Adderly should seek to meet in drafting an amended complaint.  
As Adderly would have an opportunity to file an amended complaint, the District Court 
denied the motion to supplement as moot.   
Instead of filing an amended complaint, Adderly filed a motion for reconsideration 
within two weeks of the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint.  The District Court 
declined to reconsider its dismissal order, but again granted Adderly 20 days to file an 
amended complaint.  Rather than take advantage of this second chance to revise his 
complaint, Adderly filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the District Court’s order 
denying his motion for reconsideration. 
II. 
First, we must consider our jurisdiction to hear the appeal because Adderly’s 
decision to appeal from a dismissal without prejudice presents a potential jurisdictional 
issue.  We have jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of the district courts.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “Generally, an order which dismisses a complaint without prejudice is 
neither final nor appealable because the deficiency may be corrected by the plaintiff 
without affecting the cause of action.”  Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d 
Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  “Only if the plaintiff cannot amend or declares his intention to 
stand on his complaint does the order become final and appealable.”  Id. at 951-52.  
Although there is no “clear rule for determining when a party has elected to stand on his 
or her complaint,” Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2009), we have exercised 
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jurisdiction when a plaintiff fails to amend within the time provided by the District Court, 
see Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992).  
Here, we will infer Adderly’s intention to stand on his complaint.  The District 
Court dismissed Adderly’s complaint and granted Adderly 20 days to amend it.  Instead 
of filing an amended complaint, Adderly filed a motion for reconsideration of the 
dismissal of his complaint, and then filed a notice of appeal after reconsideration was 
denied.  As a result, the District Court’s order is a final, appealable order.  See id. 
III. 
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s decision to grant a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 
2012).  “[I]n deciding a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations . . . must be taken 
as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and all inferences must 
be drawn in favor of them.”  McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quotation marks omitted).  To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint 
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  “Determining whether a complaint states 
a plausible claim to relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”  Id. at 679.  We construe 
Adderly’s pro se pleadings liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and 
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we may affirm the District Court’s judgment on any basis supported by the record, see 
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 There is no substantial question that the District Court did not err in dismissing 
Adderly’s complaint as drafted.  The complaint fails to set out “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(a)(2).  Nor is each allegation set out in a “simple, concise, and direct” way.  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 8(d)(1).  Instead, the complaint is rife with irrelevant facts that, even if accepted 
as true, do not satisfy the elements of any of the causes of action that Adderly seeks to 
bring.  A complaint must “‘be presented with clarity sufficient to avoid requiring a 
district court or opposing party to forever sift through its pages in search’ of the nature of 
the plaintiff’s claim[.]”  Glover v. F.D.I.C., 698 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1436 (7th Cir. 1990)).  Adderly’s complaint does not 
meet that standard, and Adderly refused to amend his complaint to correct that deficiency 
even when presented with multiple opportunities to do so. 
 Several additional pleading deficiencies doom Adderly’s claims as set out in his 
complaint.  First, neither Adderly’s initial assignment to PC status nor his later 
assignment to the RHU can underlie a constitutional claim based on the facts that 
Adderly pleaded.  To the extent Adderly sought to set out an Eighth Amendment 
conditions-of-confinement claim, to survive a motion to dismiss, his complaint must have 
plausibly alleged that the alleged deprivation resulted “in the denial of the minimal 
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civilized measure of life’s necessities.”  Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 
249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010).  Such a denial involves “the deprivation of a single, identifiable 
human need such as food, warmth, or exercise . . . .”  Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 
(1991).  Here, the allegations concerning Adderly’s placements do not state any facts 
that, if proven, would show that Adderly was denied one of life’s minimal necessities.  At 
most, the facts that Adderly did plead allow the potential inference that he suffered 
inconvenience or discomfort—not a constitutional deprivation.1   
 Furthermore, although Adderly found the yellow uniform associated with his PC 
status stigmatizing, based on his perception of other inmates’ viewpoints on that status, 
he does not allege that any inmate harmed him or that prison officials failed to protect 
him from harm as a result of that alleged stigmatization.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825, 847 (1994) (““[A] prison official may be held liable under the Eighth 
Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that 
inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take 
reasonable measures to abate it.”). 
 Nor has Adderly adequately alleged that he suffered the deprivation of any liberty 
interest pursuant to the Due Process Clause as a result of his custody status and housing 
                                              
 1 Also, to the extent Adderly might have sought to claim that the alleged rough 
handling that he alluded to in his complaint was a separate Eighth Amendment violation, 
that effort fails.  Adderly’s complaint does not contain sufficient factual material to 
plausibly allege that the amount of force Adderly endured was imposed maliciously and 
in a manner that exceeded the amount of force that was appropriate under the 
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assignments.  State-created liberty interests may arise only when a prison’s action 
imposed an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life.”  Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (concluding that 
the inmate’s thirty days in the Special Holding Unit, considered within the context of 
prison confinement, did not impose the type of atypical and significant deprivation of 
liberty in which the state could be seen to have created a liberty interest); Mitchell v. 
Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 532 (3d Cir. 2003).  Adderly has pleaded no facts to support the 
contention that his assignment to PC status was anything other than a regular and typical 
implementation of prison regulations to protect him from potential harm.  As for his later 
assignment to the RHU for disciplinary violations, Adderly has not pleaded facts to 
support the contention that the discipline he received was atypical or that it imposed any 
significant hardship.  See, e.g., Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(seven months of disciplinary confinement was not an atypical and significant hardship).    
 Adderly’s contention that the defendants retaliated against him for his complaints 
about his PC custody status fares no better.  Amid the exhaustive chronology of events 
that he sets out, Adderly has not pleaded facts to sufficiently allege that his objections to 
PC status were causally related to any of the purportedly adverse actions that he contends 
he endured.  See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).  In essence, Adderly 
appears to attribute nearly every disciplinary action that affected him over the course of a 
                                                                                                                                                  
circumstances.  See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). 
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year to his belief that the defendants sought to punish him for complaining about this PC 
status back in January 2012.  Adderly repeatedly asserts that the discipline he received 
was “retaliatory,” “in retaliation against” him, or “punitive” without pleading facts that 
could sufficiently allege a causal link.2   
 Moreover, based on the grievance materials that Adderly attached as exhibits to 
his complaint, the facts as alleged indicate that the same disciplinary outcomes would 
have occurred regardless of any potential retaliatory motive, which also defeats Adderly’s 
retaliation claims as set out in his complaint.  See id. at 334; cf. also Henderson v. Baird, 
29 F.3d 464, 469 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that because the finding of guilt in the 
inmate’s disciplinary hearing was based on “some evidence,” that finding “essentially 
checkmates his retaliation claim”). 
 With no facts to plausibly allege any individual acts of retaliation, Adderly also 
cannot sustain a claim that the defendants collectively conspired against him.  See Gen. 
Refractories Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 297, 313 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding 
                                              
 2 The lack of an adequately pleaded casual connection is alone sufficient to defeat 
Adderly’s retaliation claims.  Other pleading deficiencies exist as well.  For example, 
Adderly’s allegations concerning the destruction of legal materials do not state a claim 
because Adderly did not allege that he lost the opportunity to pursue a viable legal claim.  
See Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1040 (3d Cir. 1988).  As another example, 
Adderly’s claims concerning the strip searches he endured fail based on the facts that he 
pleaded.  See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. ____, ____, 132 S. Ct. 
1510, 1517 (2012).  Yet another example is that the inability to access hygiene products 
that Adderly alleged does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation due to the 
limited scope of that deprivation as alleged.  C.f., e.g., Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 
1406 (10th Cir. 1996).  Such examples of insufficient factual allegations pervade 
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that a civil conspiracy claim requires a valid underlying tort claim).  In addition, Adderly 
alleges a conspiracy without pleading any facts that could support the idea that an 
agreement among the various defendants to retaliate against Adderly actually existed.  
We must dismiss claims, like Adderly’s conspiracy claim, that are “[t]hreadbare recitals 
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”  See 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (“[A] conclusory allegation of 
agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality.”). 
 IV. 
 Finally, we consider Adderly’s proposed supplement to his complaint—which, in 
anticipation of receiving an amended complaint, the District Court did not consider.  We 
conclude that the supplement also contains allegations that fail to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted due to their vague and conclusory nature; or contains claims 
that, on their face, flout the governing statute of limitations without meeting the standard 
for relation back to Adderly’s original complaint.  See Glover, 698 F.3d at 145-46. 
* * * 
 Perhaps Adderly could have corrected the foregoing pleading deficiencies in an 
amended complaint, but after the District Court provided him the opportunity to amend 
his complaint, he declined to do so.  Because Adderly’s complaint as initially drafted 
                                                                                                                                                  
Adderly’s complaint, notwithstanding its length and laborious recitation of events. 
 11 
 
pleaded no viable claim, this appeal presents us with no substantial question.  We will 
therefore affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
